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1. Introduction
Technological advancements are commonly viewed as leading to increased productivity. 
Numerous studies document the benefits of technology on productivity in the workplace and on 
human capital accumulation.1 There are, however, potential drawbacks to new technologies, as 
they may provide distractions and reduce productivity. Mobile phones can be a source of great 
disruption in workplaces and classrooms, as they provide individuals with access to texting, games, 
social media and the Internet. Given these features, mobile phones have the potential to reduce the 
attention students pay to classes and can therefore be detrimental to learning.  
There are debates in many countries as to how schools should address the issue of mobile 
phones. Some advocate for a complete ban while others promote the use of mobile phones as a 
teaching tool in classrooms. This debate has most recently been seen with the Mayor of New York 
removing a ten year ban of phones on school premises in March 2015, stating that abolition has 
the potential to reduce inequality (Sandoval et al, 2015).2 Despite the extensive use of mobile 
phones by students and the heated debate over how to treat them, the impact of mobile phones on 
high school student performance has not yet been academically studied. 
In this paper, we estimate the effect of schools banning mobile phones on student test 
scores. The lack of consensus regarding the impact of mobile phones means that there is no UK 
government policy about their use in schools. This has resulted in schools having complete 
autonomy of their mobile phone policy, and have differed in their approaches. We exploit these 
differences through a difference in differences (DID) estimation strategy. We compare the gains 
in test scores across and within schools before and after mobile phone bans are introduced.  
In order to do this, we generated a unique dataset on the history of mobile phone and other 
school policies from a survey of high schools in four English cities (Birmingham, London, 
Leicester and Manchester), carried out in spring of 2013. This is combined with administrative 
data on the complete student population from the National Pupil Database (NPD). From this, we 
know the academic performance of all students since 2001, and so use differences in 
implementation dates of mobile phone bans to measure their impact on student performance. 
1 E.g: Kruger, 1993; Chakraborty and Kazarosian, 1999; Aral et al., 2007; Ding et al., 2009; and Malamud and Pop-
Eleches, 2011. 
2 Other examples of the debate are: Telegraph 2012; Childs, 2013; Barkham and Moss, 2012; Drury, 2012; O’Toole, 
2011; Johnson, 2012; and Carroll, 2013.   
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Moreover, the NPD tracks students over time, which allows us to account for prior test scores 
along with a set of pupil characteristics including gender, race, ever eligible for free school meals 
(FSM), and special educational needs (SEN) status. Although we do not know which individuals 
owned mobile phones, it is reported that over 90% of teenagers owned a mobile phone during this 
period in England; therefore, any ban is likely to affect the vast majority of students (Ofcom 2006, 
2011).3 Even if a student does not own a phone themselves their presence in the classroom may 
cause distraction.   
We find that following a ban on phone use, student test scores improve by 6.41% of a 
standard deviation. Our results indicate that there are no significant gains in student performance 
if a ban is not widely complied with. Furthermore, this effect is driven by the most disadvantaged 
and underachieving pupils. Students in the lowest quartile of prior achievement gain 14.23% of a 
standard deviation, whilst, students in the top quartile are neither positively nor negatively affected 
by a phone ban. The results suggest that low-achieving students are more likely to be distracted by 
the presence of mobile phones, while high achievers can focus in the classroom regardless of the 
mobile phone policy. This also implies that any negative externalities from phone use do not 
impact on the high achieving students. Schools could significantly reduce the education 
achievement gap by prohibiting mobile phone use in schools, and so by allowing phones in 
schools, New York may unintentionally increase the inequalities of outcomes. We include several 
robustness checks such as an event study, placebo bans, test for changes in student intake and 
range of alternative outcome measures. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature; 
Section 3 provides a description of the data, survey and descriptive statistics; Section 4 presents 
the empirical strategy; Section 5 is devoted to the main results and heterogeneity of the impacts; 
Section 6 provides a series of robustness checks; and Section 7 concludes with policy implications. 
2. Related literature
There is a growing literature on the impact of technology on student outcomes, which has 
yet to reach a consensus. Fairlie & Robinson (2013) conduct a large field experiment in the US 
3 We further discuss phone ownership rates in Section 3. The focus of this paper is the impact of a school level policy 
which may have impact on students who own a phone, but also on students who don’t own a phone but could still be 
distracted through the actions of others. 
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that randomly provides free home computers to students. Although computer ownership and use 
increase substantially, they find no effects on any educational outcomes. Similar findings have 
occurred in recent randomized control trials (RCTs) in developing countries where computers have 
been introduced into the school environment (Barrera-Osorio and Linden, 2009; Cristia et al., 
2012).   
Some studies have found a positive impact from technology, such as Machin et al. (2006), 
who estimate the impact of information and communication technology (ICT) investment on 
student outcomes in England, using changes in funding rules as an exogenous shock to investment. 
They find that ICT investment has a positive effect on student test scores in English and science, 
but not for mathematics (where computers were rarely used). Barrow et al. (2009) examine the 
impact of  structured computer aided instruction using a RCT design in three large urban school 
districts. They find that this math software had large impacts on students algebra test scores (0.17 
of a standard deviation).  
Specifically relating to mobile phones, Bergman (2012), as part of an RCT, used mobile 
phones to inform parents of students’ homework assignments through texting. The students of 
parents who were sent messages achieved higher test scores. Fryer (2014) provided free mobile 
phones to students in Oklahoma City Public Schools in a field experiment. Students received daily 
information on the link between human capital and future outcomes via text. There were no 
measureable changes in attendance, behavioural incidents, or test scores.4  The common theme in 
these education papers is that the mere introduction of technology has a negligible impact on 
student test scores, but when incorporated into the curriculum and being put to a well-defined use, 
technology has the potential to improve student outcomes.  
The psychological literature has also found that multitasking is detrimental to learning and 
task execution in experimental contexts. Recent experimental papers present evidence that mobile 
phone use while executing another task decreases learning and task completion (e.g. Ophir et al. 
(2009); Smith et al. (2011); Levine et al. (2013); and Lee et al. (2014)). The distracting nature of 
mobile phones has been previously examined in other context such as incidence of road accidents. 
Bhargava and Pathania (2013) exploit a pricing discontinuity in call plans and show that there is a 
4 However, Fryer (2014) does find that students’ reported beliefs about the relationship between education and 
outcomes were influenced by treatment, and treated students also report being more focused and working harder in 
school. 
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large jump in phone use after 9 p.m. This jump, however, is not followed by an increase in car 
accidents. Using vehicular fatality data from across the United States and standard difference-in-
differences techniques, Abouk & Adams (2013) find that texting bans have only a temporary 
impact on car accident fatalities, suggesting that drivers react to the announcement of a legislation 
only to return to old habits shortly afterward.  
Our contribution is to estimate the effect of mobile phone bans on high stakes student test 
scores at the end of compulsory schooling, within schools that implemented them. This is of 
particular importance given the prevalence of mobile phone technology in schools today. Our data 
allows us to investigate which students are most strongly affected by mobile bans. 
3. Student Data, Phone Use and Survey
3.1    Student characteristics and performance 
The NPD is a rich education dataset of the complete public school population of England.5 
It contains information on student performance and schools attended, plus a range of student 
characteristics such as gender, age, ethnicity, FSM eligibility and SEN status. Each student is 
allocated an individual identifier, which allows for the student to be tracked over time and across 
schools. We generate a dataset that follows students from the end of primary school at age 11 
through the end of compulsory school education at age 16.  
In England, students progress through a series of five Key Stages. Our paper focuses on 
secondary school students and their performance at the end of compulsory education examinations, 
as such they are high stakes exams and will have long run impacts on labor market outcomes. 
Students start secondary school at age 11 after completing Key Stage 2 in primary school. Key 
Stage 3 covers the first three years of secondary school and Key Stage 4 leads to subject-specific 
exams at age 16, called General Certificates of Secondary Education (GCSEs). The panel nature 
of the data allows us to condition on student achievement before they entered high school. 
Moreover, it allows us to test whether the introduction of the ban changed the composition of the 
school intake in terms of test scores or other student characteristics. 
5 Students attending private schools are not present in the data, but only represent 7% of the student population. 
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Our main measure of student achievement is based on GCSE test scores from 2001 to 2011. 
Each GCSE is graded from A* to G, with an A* being worth 58 points and decreasing in 
increments of six down to 16 for a G grade. Students take GCSEs in different subjects; the mean 
number of GCSEs (or equivalents) taken in the sample is 9. We use an individual’s sum of these 
GCSE points, standardized nationally each year, so that it has mean of 0 and standard deviation of 
1.6 This is for ease of interpretation and to account for any grade inflation that may have occurred 
during this time period.7 
We use alternative measures of student performance to examine the robustness of the 
results. First, we use a point score, which reflects the differences in the difficulty of attaining 
certain grades and student performance at Key Stage 3 (at age 14). Finally we use another standard 
measure of achievement that is widely recognized by the government and employers, which is 
whether a student earned a C or higher in at least five GCSEs, including English and math.  
3.2    Mobile phone survey 
There is no official policy or recommendation set out by the Department of Education in 
England regarding mobile phone usage in schools. Therefore, schools’ mobile phone policies are 
decided at the school level by the headteacher and the school’s governing body, which has resulted 
in a large variation in mobile phone policies. As information relating to school policies is not 
collected centrally, in the spring of 2013 we conducted a survey of high schools in four large cities 
in England (Birmingham, Leicester, London and Manchester) regarding their mobile phone 
policies. Before approaching schools, we obtained permission from the relevant Local 
Authorities.8 Every secondary school from Local Authorities where permission was granted was 
then contacted. This consisted of two personalized emails, and a follow-up phone call seven days 
after the second email, had we not yet received a reply. We invited the headteacher or school 
administrator to complete an online survey, or reply to the questions via email or over the phone.9 
6 In appendix Table A.6, we additionally provide results according to students’ performance on their top eight subjects.  
7 Grade inflation would not affect the final results, as the inclusion of year effects would account for them. However, 
standardising by year does make the summary statistics easier to interpret.  
8 We did not obtain permission from five Local Authorities in London (Hackney, Lewisham, Newham, Redbridge and 
Tower Hamlets), which combined have 77 secondary schools. The City of London Authority does not contain any 
public schools and therefore was not approached. The remaining 27 London Local Authorities gave permission, with 
337 secondary schools being approached. 
9 The survey questionnaire is presented in the Appendix. Survey website: http://mobilephoneatschool.weebly.com.  
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The survey contained questions about the school’s current policy toward mobile phones, 
when it was implemented, whether there was a previous mobile phone policy and, if so, when it 
was implemented. This was repeated until we could construct a complete mobile phone policy 
history at the school since 2000. These questions were supplemented with questions relating to 
punishments for violating the policy and the headteacher’s views on how well the policy was 
complied with. We also asked if there were any other policy or leadership changes occurring over 
the same time period, to account for any other changes in educational policy at the school. 10 
We received completed surveys from 91 schools, which represents 21% of the target high 
schools in the four cities in our sample. This response rate is comparable to other non-
governmental survey in academic research such as Card et al (2012), Hall & Krueger (2012), 
Heffetz (2011) or Brau & Fawcett (2006). Table 1 uses the NPD to illustrate the representativeness 
of the schools in our sample compared to schools in the cities and to England as a whole, over the 
entire period. Comparing standardized age 16 test scores, we see that schools in these cities score 
approximately the same as the national average, but that the schools in our sample over the whole 
period achieve significantly higher scores than other schools within these cities (0.07σ). In 
contrast, the cities have slightly lower age 11 achievement than the national average, and the 
sampled schools have an even lower intake quality (-0.09σ), although not statically significant at 
the 10% level. Taken together, this implies that the schools in our sample over the 2001-2011 
period have a higher gain in test scores than the average school. Despite this, the sample schools 
have a significantly more disadvantaged population than other schools in the cities and nationally, 
enrolling more minority, SEN and FSM -eligible pupils. There is no difference in the proportion 
of male students nationally, between the schools in surveyed cities or in the sample. 
 Table 2 presents statistics on when mobile phone policies were put into effect and how 
well they were complied with. There are a multitude of ways in which schools have restricted 
phone use, from asking for them to be set on silent to not allowing them on school premises. We 
define a school as introducing a school ban if that school did not allow them on the premises or 
required them to be handed in at the start of the day. Only one school in our sample did not restrict 
10 This is open to recall bias, but we would expect that headteachers would be very familiar with school-level policies 
and leadership changes. This is complemented by additional information on policy and leadership changes from each 
of the schools’ websites. Examples of changes are: uniform policy, new buildings, girls allowed in schools and school 
mergers.  
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the use of mobile phones between 2001 and 2011. Headteachers were asked to rate to what extent 
the policy was adhered to by students on a seven-point scale (with 1 meaning “not at all” to 7 
meaning “completely”).  A school was considered to have a high-compliance ban if the response 
was greater than four. The table shows that most bans were implemented between 2005 and 2010, 
and that bans are typically complied with.  
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the same characteristics of the surveyed schools 
pre- and post-ban introduction in comparison to other schools in their cities. The pre-policy 
averages allow us to compare the representativeness of the surveyed schools before the policies 
were introduced. We see that the responding schools look very similar to other schools in their 
cities in terms of their age 16 test scores, SEN, FSM and gender make up. The only considerable 
difference is that they tend to recruit lower achieving students and have more minority students.  
Examining the post-ban characteristics provides the first evidence of any impact the 
policies may have along with any potential confounding changes in the compositions of the cohorts 
due to the change in phone policies. Comparing the changes over time, we see that student 
achievement at age 16 significantly increases post-policy compared to pre-policy, but that there is 
no corresponding significant improvement in the prior performance of the intake students to these 
schools. This implies that there is minimal sorting by parents according to mobile phone policies 
or any other changes that occurred in the school. Other permanent student characteristics change 
slightly pre- and post-ban, with a 5% decrease in the proportion of minority students and a 5% and 
6% increase in the proportion of SEN and FSM students, respectively. As these variables are not 
standardized each year, these differences may reflect general trends in the population. Once the 
changes over time and the differences across schools are taken into account, there are no significant 
differences in variables before and after bans are introduced.11  
Reassuringly these permanent student characteristics are similar for the responding school 
that never introduced a mobile phone ban. On average students from this school do have higher 
grades on entry and exit compared to adopting schools. The raw value-added is very similar to the 
adopting schools pre-policy but lower than the schools post adoption. This, combined with the 
11 We estimate the effect of these variables on an indicator variable if a policy has been introduced at that school, 
conditional on year and school effects. Each characteristic is tested separately and none were found to be significantly 
correlated. See Table A.1 for results; we find no evidence of sorting based on student characteristics.  
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increase in age 16 test scores after ban, could be taken as an early indications of the benefits of 
restricting mobile phone use in schools. 
These comparisons are made using the characteristics of the students that we use for the 
analysis. However, one may be concerned that the intake of the schools changes once the policy 
has been introduced which may alter the nature of the schooling environment and hence impact on 
student test scores. Whilst these potential affects could be interpreted as the total policy impact of 
a mobile phone ban in a partial equilibrium, with parents sorting between schools with and without 
bans, the goal of this paper is to estimate the impact of bans in schools that implemented them. To 
this end, we present series of event studies on the intake of these schools before and after the phone 
bans conditional on school and year effects in Appendix Figures A.1. The characteristics (gender, 
FSM, SEN, minority status, age 11 test scores) of students enrolling in their first year of these 
schools before or after the ban are not significantly different from those enrolling in the year of 
the ban. There are trends in the type of student not captured by the year effects, but there is no 
change in the trends with the introduction of the ban. Moreover, the direction of these trends would 
work against finding an impact of banning policies as the student intakes are increasingly from 
underperforming groups (increasing rates of FSM, and SEN students and worsening prior test 
scores).   
3.3    Mobile phone use 
Any impact a school mobile phone ban could have would be tempered if teenagers did not 
use phones in the first instance. Survey research by the Office of Communications (Ofcom) finds 
that teenagers in the UK have similar mobile ownership rates as adults since mid-2000s (Ofcom, 
2011). Figure 1 shows the percentage of individuals who owned a mobile phone in England 
between 2000 and 2011. It shows a steady increase in ownership, reaching 94% in 2011. A further 
survey of teenagers in 2005 found that 82% of 12-16 years old owned a mobile phone, being 
slightly higher than the overall rate of 80% (Ofcom, 2006). This masks the differential ownership 
rates amongst teens, there is a large increase in ownership and usage rates occurring between ages 
14 and 16. Although there are differences by age, ownership rates do not vary considerably across 
income groups among UK teenagers (Ofcom, 2011). Therefore despite not having individual 
phone use data, we are confident that a school introducing a ban would potentially have a large 
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impact on the access to phones. Moreover, it needs not be the case for an individual to use a phone 
to be distracted by them, their use by others in the classroom may cause disruptions.   
4. Empirical strategy
We estimate the impact of a mobile phone ban on student achievement, exploiting 
differences in the timing of the introduction of policies across different schools. Equation (1) 
presents our baseline specification: 
௜ܻ௦௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܤܽ݊௦௧ ൅ ߤ௦ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௦௧ (1)
where ௜ܻ௦௧ is the test score of student i in high school s in year t. Our primary measure of student 
performance is test score at age 16.12  ܤܽ݊௦௧	is the indicator variable of interest for whether school 
s prohibits mobile phones from its premises in time period t.  Accordingly, the coefficient of 
interest ߚଵ captures the impact of the introduction of the mobile phone ban on student test scores, 
estimated using the within-school variation in test scores over time. We assume there are three 
components to the error term that are unobservable; µ is the difference in student performance due 
to school effects, γ represents common shocks to all students in a particular year, and ߝ is the 
idiosyncratic error and contains all of the variation in individual outcomes within a school year.  
There may be a concern that only high-achieving schools introduce mobile phone bans, 
which could lead to overestimating the effects of a mobile phone ban. Similarly, if there was a 
positive trend in student test scores and mobile phone bans were only introduced in the later 
periods, some of this growth would be incorrectly attributed to bans. We can account for these two 
possibilities by allowing for school and year mean achievement to vary through fixed effects. The 
inclusion of these fixed effects allows for the introduction of mobile phone bans to be non-random, 
i.e. more likely to occur in schools with low or high test scores, allowing for covariance between 
ܤܽ݊௦௧ and ߤ௦ as well as ߛ௧.13 
12 We use test score at age 16 as our primary measures of student performance as mobile ownership is higher among 
older teens and test at age 16 are high stakes exams. We also estimate impacts on achievement level at age 14 in Table 
8. Results using achievement level at age 14 are smaller and insignificant.
13 Note it does not allow for the effect of the ban to vary across schools or student types. Standard errors are clustered at 
the school level to account for correlations within school overtime. We also tested using percentile-t cluster bootstrap as 
in Cameron et al (2008) for the main specification. Results were similar. 
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Specification (1) is restrictive, as it does not allow for differences in student outcomes 
within a school other than through ߝ௜௦௧. The individual level panel aspect of the NPD allows us to 
condition on students’ prior performance at the end of primary school Yist−1, accounting for student 
ability and all school and family investments up until the start of secondary school. This can be 
seen in specification (2) this changes the interpretation of the ߚଵ	parameter from the increase in 
test scores due to the ban, to the increase in the gains in test scores due to the ban. In addition to 
prior achievement, we also condition on a vector of other observable student characteristics, Xi, 
representing: FSM eligibility, SEN status, gender and ethnicity. The inclusion of these individual 
controls ostensibly accounts for student sorting to schools on the basis of observable inputs. The 
extent to which ߚଵ	 changes with their inclusion provides us with a gauge for how many students 
sort to schools based on phone bans. 
௜ܻ௦௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܤܽ݊௦௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܻ௦௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ ௜ܺ௦௧ ൅ ߤ௦ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௦௧ (2)
A final potential threat arises if there are other positive changes to a school that are 
correlated with the introduction of a mobile phone ban. Up to this point, we have assumed that 
school effects are invariant over time; if schools introduced other policies that improved test scores 
at the same time as a phone ban, this again would lead to overestimating the effect of a ban. To 
address this, we use survey information to control for any leadership or policy changes that 
occurred during the period of analysis. ܱݐ݄݁ݎܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௦௧ is a dummy variable to control for other 
leadership or policy changes.14 In our most demanding specification, we also account for mean 
peer prior achievement for each student  തܻି ௜௦௧ିଵ. We know which students are in the same school 
cohort as student i, and it is possible that students affect each other’s growth in test scores through 
peer effects. The inclusion of prior peer achievement and information on other policy and 
leadership changes, as represented by equation (3), allows us to account for time-variant 
characteristics of the school. 
	 ௜ܻ௦௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܤܽ݊௦௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܻ௦௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ ௜ܺ௦௧ ൅ ߚସܱݐ݄݁ݎܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௦௧ ൅ ߚହ തܻି ௜௦௧ିଵ ൅ ߤ௦ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௦௧							 (3) 
14 The variable ܱݐ݄݁ݎܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௦௧	takes a value of 1 for the years after a change at a school occurs. We combine 
information coming from our survey of headteachers and information from school’s website. We do not observe 
multiple change of policies/leader in addition to the phone policy change, hence a binary variable can be used. 
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Finally, we estimate the heterogeneity of the impact of mobile phone bans by student 
characteristics in a triple differences framework. ߚଵ௖ is the additional difference in student 
outcomes by binary student characteristic c within schools that implemented a ban in period t. We 
use our most flexible specification (3) above for these estimates and obtain the additional effect of 
a ban on SEN students, FSM students, males, minorities and by achievement level at age 11. 
௜ܻ௦௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܤܽ݊௦௧ ൅ ߚଵ௖ܤܽ݊௦௧ ∗ ܥ݄ܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿ௜ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܻ௦௧ିଵ 
൅ߚଷ ௜ܺ௦௧ ൅ ߚସܱݐ݄݁ݎܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௦௧ 	൅ ߚହ തܻି ௜௦௧ିଵ ൅ ߤ௦ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௦௧ (4)
5. Results
5.1    Main results 
Table 4 presents estimates of the impact of a mobile phone ban on individual student 
performance. There are five columns, which account for more potential biases as one moves from 
left to right. Column 1 is the most basic specification that only accounts for the across-school and 
across-year mean differences in test scores. Here we find a positive relationship between the 
introduction of a mobile phone ban and student test scores of 5.67 percent of a standard deviation. 
However, we still may be concerned that student sorting by observable or unobservable 
characteristics may be driving this estimate; columns 2 and 3 include student characteristics in 
order to account for this. Conditioning on prior performance indicates that the growth in test scores 
is 0.062σ, and this increases to 0.065σ when other student characteristics are also controlled for.  
The last two columns account for time-varying school characteristics. Including an 
indicator variable, which denotes whether there was a leadership change or other policy change 
has taken place at the school during the period in year t or later, increases the estimate slightly. 
Results of our preferred specification (5), which allows for mean peer effects, are marginally 
smaller, but continue to show an improvement in student performance after a school bans mobile 
phones.  After a ban has been introduced, the average student attending that school has 6.41% of 
a standard deviation greater gains in test scores compared to a school that did not introduce a ban. 
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5.2    Heterogeneity 
Table 5 studies the heterogeneity of a ban on students with different characteristics, under 
a triple differences framework, estimating the additional impact on SEN, FSM, male students and 
by prior test score. This is in addition to any baseline effects of the ban under specification (5). 
The results indicate that a mobile phone ban has a positive and significant impact on FSM-eligible 
students (column 1) and SEN students (column 2). The baseline effect of a mobile phone ban is 
positive but not statistically significant at the 10% level in these specifications. The interaction of 
the ban with prior achievement is negative (column 4), implying that it is predominantly low-
ability students who gain from a ban. The coefficient of -0.0604 means that students in the top 
percentile nationally would lose 0.0604σ with the introduction of a ban compared to a student in 
the lowest percentile. However, there is a general positive effect of a ban of 0.0621σ, and so overall 
high-achieving students are not harmed by a ban. This is tested formally in the next table. Column 
5 additionally includes interactions with FSM and SEN simultaneously; we find that the ability 
and SEN interaction terms are significant. This is in line with the heterogeneity results, with the 
most at-risk students gaining the most. 
Table 6 examines the relationship of the impact of mobile phone bans by prior achievement 
in more detail. Students are grouped into five quintiles based on their achievement level at age 11, 
where group 1 has the lowest level of achievement and group 5 has the highest. Here, the 
coefficients represent the total effect of a ban by ability quintile. Again we see that low-achieving 
students gain the most from a ban, and the impact gradually reduces throughout the prior ability 
distribution. Those in the lowest quintiles gain 0.1423σ and 0.0986σ respectively after a ban has 
been introduced. Only the top quintiles do not significantly gain from the policy, but they are also 
not negatively affected.15 This suggests that high prior achieving students are able to concentrate 
in class regardless of the mobile phone policy in place but low-achieving students are distracted 
by mobile phone use. This also implies that any negative externalities from phone use does not 
impact on the high achieving students.   
One would expect the impact of a mobile phone ban to vary according to how well it was 
complied with. We replace the single ܤܽ݊௦௧ variable with two variables: one for bans with high 
15 We reproduced Table 6 by gender: one table for males and one table for females. The results are very similar for 
both tables, with males and females in low-achieving groups at age 11 gaining the most from a mobile ban. 
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compliance,	ܪ݄݅݃ܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁௦௧, and one for bans with low compliance, ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݉݌݈݅ܽ݊ܿ݁௦௧. 
Table 7 shows the impact of the ban by level of compliance. As expected, we find larger effects in 
schools that report a high level of compliance with a ban compared to schools where compliance 
is weak, where there is no statistically significant impact.16 
As discussed above, mobile phone ownership is higher for older teens and a big increase 
occurs between age 14 and 16. One would therefore expect the impact of a mobile ban on student 
test score at age 14 to be smaller. Table 8 replicates Table 4, now estimating the impact on test 
scores at age 14. We find the impact of the ban remains positive but is smaller and not significant.  
6    Robustness checks  
6.1 Event study & Students intake 
As a first robustness, we first check for potential trends in student attainment that were 
present before the introduction of the ban. Figure 2 plots the impact of bans by exposure length. 
Estimates for negative exposure refer to the years prior to a ban, where we would expect the ban 
to have no impact. Using our most preferred specification, we find that bans have significant 
effects only after they have been implemented. There is a general upward trend in the impact of 
the ban, which reflects that students have experienced more time in a school with a phone ban in 
place.17 Moreover, there is little evidence that schools were generally improving before 
introducing a phone ban, as all the years prior to the ban do not have impacts significantly different 
from zero and are not increasing.  
Table A.1 and Figures A.1 investigate different types of potential pupils due to the ban. 
Table A.1 tests whether the types of students being tested in the high stakes exams are significantly 
different after a school has introduced a phone ban. Conditional on school and year fixed effects 
students are no more likely to be male, FSM, SEN, or have high prior achievement after then ban.  
16 The compliance measure is coming from our mobile phone survey. Headteachers were asked to rate to what extent 
the policy was adhered to by students on a seven-point scale (with 1 meaning “not at all” to 7 meaning “completely”). 
A school was considered to have a high-compliance ban if the response was greater than four. We also created an 
alternative measure of compliance using punishment at the school after a phone is used. Results were similar and 
available upon request. 
17 Estimations that directly estimated this additional positive trend failed to find a significant relationship. Given the 
upward trend found in the treated schools we do not additionally include individual school time trends as this will 
absorb some of the treatment.  
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Figure A.1 presents a series of graphs plotting the high school intake before and after ban by pupil 
characteristics. Even though these students will be five academic years below the students taking 
the exams, any positive change in their characteristics may reflect an easier workload on teachers 
in the school. However, Figure A.1 shows that the type of pupil are not sorting to schools due to 
the mobile phone ban being in place. 
6.2 Placebo tests 
We next check a key assumption of the model, that we obtain unbiased estimates of ߚଵ as 
long as ܥ݋ݒሺ	ܤܽ݊௜௦௧, ߝ௜௦௧ሻ ൌ 0. If schools that introduced a mobile phone ban were improving 
regardless, then these gains could be falsely attributed to the policy and we would have an upward 
biased result. We test this by using a placebo treatment, which is generated by turning on the ban 
dummy two years before it was actually initiated. This placebo intervention should have no 
significant impact on the gains in student test scores. If there is a positive significant relationship, 
then there are correlations between the trend and the intervention. Table 9 presents a parallel set 
of results as Table 4, but with the effects of a placebo intervention. Placebo treatments do not 
produce significant gains in student test scores. We take this as further evidence that prior trends 
are not generating these results.  
6.3 More recent prior ability measures  
Thus far we have used age 11 test scores as a measure of prior achievement for student 
achievement at age 16. However, there is another statutory exam that takes place between these 
ages. We replicate Table 4 in Table 10 using achievement at age 14 as a measure of ability instead 
of the age 11 test scores. This has the advantage that it is a more recent measure of student ability, 
but has the disadvantage that these exams are conducted in secondary school and therefore could 
also be affected by the ban. To account for this, we only use the age 14 test scores of students 
attending schools that have not yet implanted a ban. As there is only two years between the age 14 
and age 16 exams, this reduces the sample significantly, but also examines the short-run impact of 
phone bans.18 The estimates are very similar to our previous estimates. Conditional on age 14 test 
18 Specifications that allowed for the impact of the effect to increase over time, to reflect the extended exposure that 
students would have to the ban, did not find any significant additional effect after a ban is first introduced. 
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scores, mobile phone ban improves gains in test scores by 5.86% of a standard deviation.  These 
results again in part address the issue of pre-trends, as we see that there are significantly larger 
gains in test scores between age 14 and 16 for students who were attending schools that introduced 
a ban during that time. This is a small window of time for other effects to occur. If a positive trends 
were in place in schools prior to this, the age 14 tests scores would be higher and gains in test 
scores would be accordingly lower. The heterogeneity of these results is replicated conditional on 
age 14 ability. Table A.2 presents similar results to Table 6.  The estimates by ability have slightly 
smaller positive effect for the least able students, but these effects are not significantly different 
from those in Table 6.  
6.4  Alternative outcome measures 
One may be additionally concerned that these results are dependent on the outcome 
measure that we are using. Therefore, in the appendix we replicate the previous results using a set 
of outcome variables to establish the robustness of the estimates. The age 16 measure of 
achievement used so far in this paper is the standardized point score for all exams taken at the end 
of compulsory schooling. An alternate scoring system, which accounts for the different difficulties 
for attaining certain grades, is also used and associated tables can be found in the Appendix (Table 
A.3). The results and conclusion are once again similar. Tables A.4 and A.5 also replicate the 
heterogeneity table using the alternative age 16 test score measures, reaching the same conclusion. 
As some students take more GCSEs than others, thereby allowing for higher total test scores, 
another measure that is sometimes used is the student’s total score in their top eight subjects. Any 
general increase in exams taken over time will be accounted for by the within year standardisation 
of test scores. In appendix Table A.6, we provide results according to this measure and results are 
once again similar. This is not our preferred measure as the number of GCSEs taken could itself 
be an outcome. This is evidence that the ban is not just related to more exams being taken, but 
higher test scores achieved. 
As noted previously, whether a student scores at least a C on at least five GCSEs, including 
English and math, is also a recognized measure of achievement used by schools and parents. We 
derive a binary variable representing whether this standard is met for each student in our sample. 
This is used as the outcome of interest in the same specifications, and so assumes a linear 
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probability model. In our most demanding specification, we find that a ban improves the 
probability of a student attaining a C or better on five GCSEs by 2.01 percentage points against a 
baseline of 38% students in our sample attaining this level (Table A.7). Finally, we present 
equivalent results at the school level for attaining 5+ GCSEs (Table A.8), which again shows that 
schools improve after the introduction of a ban.  
 Overall, results are robust to alternative specifications and to a set of student 
characteristics, including different measures of prior achievement and peer effects. These 
numerous robustness checks provide confidence that mobile phone bans play a role in determining 
school and student performance. 
7. Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of restricting mobile phone use in schools on student 
productivity. We combine survey data on mobile phone policies in schools in four cities in England 
with administrative data on student achievement to create a history of student performance in 
schools. By exploiting differences in implementation dates, our results indicate that there is an 
improvement in student performance of 6.41% of a standard deviation in schools that have 
introduced a mobile phone ban. 
The existing literature on the impact of technology in the classroom implies that the 
unstructured presence of technology has ambiguous impacts on student achievement. We add to 
this by illustrating that a highly multipurpose technology, such as mobile phones, can have a 
negative impact on productivity through distraction. Schools that restrict access to mobile phones 
subsequently experience an improvement in test scores. However, these findings do not discount 
the possibility that mobile phones could be a useful learning tool if their use is properly structured. 
Our findings suggest that the presence of mobile phones in schools should not be ignored.  
 Finally, we find that mobile phone bans have very different effects on different types of 
students. Banning mobile phones improves outcomes for the low-achieving students (14.23% of a 
standard deviation) the most and has no significant impact on high achievers. The results suggest 
that low-achieving students are more likely to be distracted by the presence of mobile phones, 
while high achievers can focus in the classroom regardless of whether phones are present. Given 
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heterogeneous results, banning mobile phones could be a low-cost way for schools to reduce 
educational inequality. 
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Figure 1: Mobile Phone Ownership Rates in England 
  Notes: Phone ownership rates in England amongst individuals 13 years and older. 
  Sources: Oftel/Ofcom, based on face-to-face survey data, 2011 
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Figure 2: Impact of Phone Ban by Years of Exposure 
Notes: Estimated impact on age 16 standardised test scores of mobile phone ban by years of 
exposure, conditional on school and year effects, age 11 test scores and pupil characteristics. 
Reference year is the year prior to introduction. Error bars represent the 95% confidence 
intervals with robust standard errors clustered at the school level.  Sources: National Pupil Data 
Base and author-conducted mobile phone policy survey of schools in four cities in England: 
Birmingham, Leicester, London and Manchester. 
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                  Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables - Representativeness of Sample 
Student Characteristics    All Students in 
England 
Students in 
Sampled Cities 
Students  in 
Responding 
Schools 
Difference Between 
Responding Schools 
and Schools in 
Surveyed 
Cities 
Test scores: Age 16  0.000 0.013 0.071 0.069
(1.000) (1.018) (0.937) (0.041)
Test scores: Age 11  0.000 -0.034 -0.094 -0.072
(1.000) (1.011) (1.007) (0.044)
Male 0.506 0.502 0.467 -0.042
(0.500) (0.5) (0.499) (0.032)
Minority 0.182 0.454 0.593 0.166
(0.386) (0.498) (0.491) (0.04)
SEN 0.146 0.166 0.181 0.018
(0.353) (0.372) (0.385) (0.011)
FSM 0.162 0.239 0.308 0.082
(0.368) (0.427) (0.462) (0.022)
Total students 5,576,276 789,638 130,482
Notes:  Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for key variables for all schools, schools in city surveyed, schools in sample and 
difference between schools in sample and in city surveyed. SEN means special educational needs students and FSM means 
Free School Meal students. Sources: National Pupil Database (NPD) and author-conducted mobile phone survey. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Mobile Phone Policies 
Year Mobile Bans High-compliance Bans 
Low-compliance 
Bans 
2000 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 0
2002 3 2 1
2003 6 5 1
2004 9 7 2
2005 19 13 6
2006 29 20 9
2007 43 31 12
2008 58 38 20
2009 71 47 24
2010 85 54 31
2011 88 55 33
2012 90 56 34
Notes: Table depicts the number of mobile phone bans in our sample each year. Headteachers were asked 
what their phone policy is and when it was introduced. A phone ban is classified as 1) A complete ban of 
mobile phones on school grounds; or 2) Students hand all phones in at the start of school. Headteachers 
were asked to rate the extent to which the policy is adhered to by students on a seven-point scale with 1 
representing “Not at all” and 7 representing “Completely.” A school was considered to have a high-
compliance ban if the response was greater than four. Sources: Author-conducted mobile phone policy 
survey of schools in four cities in England: Birmingham, Leicester, London and Manchester. 
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               Table 3: Descriptive Statistics on Key Variables Pre- and Post-Policy 
Student Characteristics    Students 
in 
Sampled 
Cities 
Students  
in 
Responding 
Schools 
Pre Phone 
Ban 
Post Phone 
Ban 
Pre-Post 
Difference 
Never Ban 
Phone 
Test scores: Age 16 0.0130 0.0710 0.0200 0.1168 0.0931 0.1400 
Test scores: Age 11 
(1.0181) (0.9369) (0.9566) (0.9159) (0.0389) (0.9261) 
-0.0339 -0.0937 -0.107 -0.0845 0.0186 0.0187 
(1.0109) (1.007) (1.0092) (1.0062) (0.0413) (0.9542) 
Male 0.5022 0.4674 0.4659 0.4668 -0.0013 0.5345 
(0.500) (0.4989) (0.4988) (0.4989) (0.0243) (0.4989) 
Minority 0.656 0.741 0.7669 0.7151 -0.0526 0.7917 
(0.475) (0.4381) (0.4228) (0.4514) (0.0251) (0.4062) 
SEN 0.1657 0.1806 0.1527 0.2061 0.0519 0.2023 
(0.3719) (0.3847) (0.3597) (0.4045) (0.0126) (0.4018) 
FSM 0.2406 0.3138 0.2801 0.3473 0.0682 0.2488 
(0.4274) (0.464) (0.4491) (0.4761) (0.0177) (0.4324) 
Total students 789,638 130,482 62,214 66,266 2002 
Notes: Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for key variables pre- and post-policy and for all schools and schools in the city 
surveyed. SEN means special educational needs students and FSM means Free School Meal students.  Sources: National Pupil 
Database (NPD) and author-conducted mobile phone survey. 
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Table 4: Effect of Mobile Bans on Student Performance 
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mobile ban 0.0567 0.0619* 0.0654* 0.0669* 0.0641* 
(0.0364) (0.0357) (0.0361) (0.0368) (0.0373) 
Prior test scores: Age 11     
Student characteristics    
Other policy changes   
Prior peer achievement    
School effects      
Year effects      
Observations 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 
Notes: Table 4 presents regression estimates for student performance. The outcome variable is the standardized 
test score at age 16. We use robust clustered standard errors at the school level with school and year fixed effects. 
Student characteristics are controlled for whether a student is male, a minority, SEN or FSM. SEN means special 
educational needs students and FSM means Free School Meal students. The “Other policy changes” variable 
controls for whether there was a leadership or policy changes occurring at the time of the introduction of a mobile 
phone ban.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: National Pupil Database (NPD) and author-conducted 
mobile phone survey. 
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Table 5: The Effect of Mobile Phone Bans on Student Performance by Student Characteristics 
Notes: Table 5 presents regression estimates for student performance. The outcome variable is the standardized test score in a student’s 
eight best subjects. We use robust clustered standard errors at the school level with school and year fixed effects. Student characteristics 
are controlled for using indicators for whether the student was male, a minority, SEN and FSM. SEN means special educational needs 
students and FSM means Free School Meal students. The “Other policy changes” variable controls for whether there was a leadership or 
policy changes occurring at the time of the introduction of a mobile phone ban.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: National Pupil 
Database (NPD) and author-conducted mobile phone survey. 
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mobile ban 0.0432 0.0457 0.0445  0.0621* 0.0405 
(0.0385) (0.0393) (0.0397)  (0.0374) (0.0405) 
Mobile ban * FSM     0.0658** 0.0382 
(0.0282) (0.026)
Mobile ban * SEN      0.1100***   0.0591* 
(0.0327)   (0.0329) 
Mobile ban * Male     0.0424
(0.0389)
Mobile ban * Prior test 
scores:  Age 11   -0.0604*** 
(0.0133) 
 
  -0.0488*** 
 (0.0129) 
 
Prior test scores: Age 11      
Student characteristics      
Other policy changes      
Prior peer achievement      
School effects      
Year effects      
Observations 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482   130,482 
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Table 6: The Effect of Mobile Phone Bans on Student Performance by Prior performance 
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Impact by age 11 test scores 
Mobile ban * 1st Quintile  0.1306*** 0.1421*** 0.1444*** 0.1423***
(0.0389) (0.0396) (0.0402) (0.0404)
Mobile ban * 2nd Quintile  0.0868** 0.0984** 0.1007** 0.0986**
(0.0385) (0.0389) (0.0398) (0.0401)
Mobile ban * 3rd Quintile 0.0566 0.0659* 0.0677* 0.0654
(0.0389) (0.0395) (0.0402) (0.0409)
Mobile ban * 4th Quintile 0.0275 0.0245 0.026 0.0229
(0.0399) (0.0396) (0.0403) (0.0409)
Mobile ban * 5th Quintile -0.0118 -0.0224 -0.0216 -0.0254
(0.0412) (0.0422) (0.0428) (0.0429)
Test scores: Age 11 
categorical 
   
Student characteristics   
Other policy changes  
Prior peer achievement 
School effects    
Year effects    
Observations 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482
Notes: Table 6 presents regression estimates for student performance. The outcome variable is the standardized test score in 
a student GCSE exams. We use robust clustered standard errors at the school level with school and year fixed effects. Student 
characteristics are controlled for whether a student is male, a minority, SEN or FSM. SEN means Special Educational Needs 
students and FSM means Free School Meal students. Key Stage 2 represents standardized test scores at age 11. In this table, 
student are divided into quintiles based on their achievement level at age 11, where group 1 is the lowest-achieving group 
and group 5 is the highest-achieving group. The “Other policy changes” variable controls for whether there was a leadership 
or policy changes occurring at the time of the introduction of a mobile phone ban.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: 
National Pupil Database (NPD) and author-conducted mobile phone survey. 
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Table 7: The Effect of Mobile Phone Bans on Student Performance by Ban Compliance 
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
High Compliance mobile ban 0.0619* 0.0668* 0.0699* 0.0717** 0.0692* 
(0.0402) (0.0403) (0.0405) (0.0413) (0.0413) 
Low Compliance mobile ban 0.0159 0.0233 0.0294 0.0298 0.0241 
(0.1109) (0.1058) (0.1051) (0.1055) (0.1079) 
Prior test scores: Age 11     
Student characteristics    
Other policy changes   
Prior peer achievement  
School effects      
Year effects      
Observations 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 
Notes: Table 7 presents regression estimates for student performance. It separates bans into high-compliance 
(principal assessment score above 4 out of 7) and low-compliance mobile bans. The outcome variable is the 
standardized test score at age 16. We use robust clustered standard errors at the school level with school and 
year fixed effects. Student characteristics are controlled for whether a student is male, a minority, SEN or FSM. 
SEN means Special Educational Needs students and FSM means Free School Meal students. The “Other policy 
changes” variable controls for whether there was a leadership or policy changes occurring at the time of the 
introduction of a mobile phone ban.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Sources: National Pupil Database (NPD) 
and author-conducted mobile phone survey. 
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Table 8: Effect of Mobile Bans on Student Performance at Age 14 
Age 14 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mobile ban 0.0077 0.0231 0.0268 0.026 0.0245 
(0.0187) (0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0173) 
Prior test scores: Age 11     
Student characteristics    
Other policy changes   
Prior peer achievement  
School effects      
Year effects      
Observations 112,212 112,212 112,212 112,212 112,212 
Notes: Table 8 presents regression estimates for student performance at age 14. The outcome variable is the 
standardized test score at age 14.  We use robust clustered standard errors at the school level with school and 
year fixed effects. Student characteristics are controlled for based on whether the student is a male, a minority, 
SEN or FSM. SEN means Special Educational Needs students and FSM means Free School Meal students. 
The “Other policy changes” variable controls for whether there was a leadership or policy changes occurring 
at the time of the introduction of a mobile phone ban. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Sources: National Pupil 
database (NPD) and author-conducted mobile phone survey. 
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Table 9: Effect of Placebo Mobile Bans on Student Performance 
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Placebo mobile ban 0.0288 0.0296 0.0240 0.0335 0.0326
(0.0525) (0.0503) (0.0518) (0.0501) (0.0512)
Prior test scores: Age 11     
Student characteristics    
Other policy changes   
Prior peer achievement  
School effects      
Year effects      
Observations 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 
Notes: Table 9 presents regression estimates for student performance. A placebo ban is introducing the ban two years before it 
was actually introduced. The outcome variable is the standardized test score at age 16. We use robust clustered standard errors 
at the school level with school and year fixed effects. Student characteristics are controlled for whether a student is male, a 
minority, SEN or FSM. SEN means Special Educational Needs students and FSM means Free School Meal students. The 
“Other policy changes” variable controls for whether there was a leadership or policy changes occurring at the time of the 
introduction of a mobile phone ban.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: National Pupil Database (NPD) and author-
conducted mobile phone survey. 
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Table 10: Effect of Mobile Bans on Student Performance Conditioning on Age 14 Test Scores 
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mobile ban 0.0655* 0.0535* 0.0599* 0.0598* 0.0586* 
(0.0376) (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0336) (0.0341) 
Prior test scores: Age 14     
Student characteristics    
Other policy changes   
Peer characteristics  
School effects       
Year effects       
Observations 83,211 83,211 83,211 83,211 83,211 
Notes: Table 10 presents regression estimates for student performance. The outcome variable is the standardized 
test score at age 16 and control for standardized test score at age 14. Estimated on the sample of students who had 
not been exposed to the ban when examined at age 14. We use robust clustered standard errors at the school level 
with school and year fixed effects. Student characteristics are controlled for whether a student is male, a minority, 
SEN or FSM. SEN means Special Educational Needs students and FSM means Free School Meal students. The 
“Other policy changes” variable controls for whether there was a leadership or policy changes occurring at the time 
of the introduction of a mobile phone ban.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Sources: National Pupil Database 
(NPD) and author-conducted mobile phone survey. 
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Appendix A 
Mobile Phone Survey Questionnaire 
Question 1.1) What best describes the school’s current mobile phone policy? 
a) Complete ban of mobile phones on school grounds
b) Allowed on grounds, but must be turned off
c) Allowed on grounds, but must be turned to silent and off during classes
d) Allowed on grounds, but must be turned to silent at all times
e) Allowed on grounds, but must be considerate with use
f) Other
g) None
Question 1.2) If Other, could you please briefly describe current policy.  
Note: Only Answer: Hand into reception, and collected at end of day. 
Question 1.3) When was the current policy first introduced? 
Question 1.4) What are the punishments for misuse of phones on school grounds?  
Question 1.5) Out of 7, to what extent would you say the policy is adhered to by students? 
[With 7 being “Completely” and 1 being “Not at all”] 
Question 2) Was there a different policy in place before this? - Yes/No 
If Yes, please answer the following.  
If No, please skip to question 4.  
In the space below, please answer questions 1.2 to 1.5 for this pervious policy (brief 
description of policy/introduction date/punishments/adherence). 
Question 3) Was there a different policy in place before this? - Yes/No  
If Yes, please answer the following.  
If No, please skip to Question 4.  
In the space below, please answer questions 1.2 to 1.5 for this previous policy (brief 
description of policy/introduction date/punishments/adherence). 
Question 4) Were there any other policy or leadership changes at the same time as the mobile 
policy change? 
Question 5) Do you have any other comments? 
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Figures A.1 
Notes: Estimated impact of mobile phone ban on school intake at age 11, by pupil characteristics conditional on year and school 
effects. Reference year is the year prior to introduction. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals with robust standard errors 
clustered at the school level.  Sources: National Pupil Data Base and author-conducted mobile phone policy survey of schools in four 
cities in England: Birmingham, Leicester, London and Manchester. 
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Table A.1: Balancing Test 
Variables Age 11 Student 
Performance 
Male Minority SEN FSM 
Mobile ban -0.0094 -0.0042 -0.0005 0.0096 0.0053 
(0.0124) (0.0043) (0.0072) (0.0101) (0.0061) 
Observations 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 
Notes: Table A.1 presents regression estimates for different outcome variables to investigate whether schools 
that impose a ban are different and if students are sorting into schools based on student characteristics. SEN 
means the proportion of students that are Special Educational Needs students and FSM means the proportion 
of students that are Free School Meal students. Male and Minority are the proportion of students that are male 
or from a minority group, respectively. We use robust clustered standard errors at the school level with school 
and year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Sources: National Pupil Database (NPD) and author-
conducted mobile phone survey. 
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Table A.2: Effect of Mobile Bans on Student Performance by Prior Achievement Group Age 14 
Age 16 Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Impact by age 14 test scores 
Mobile ban * 1st Quintile  0.1015*** 0.1100*** 0.1118*** 0.1046*** 
(0.0353) (0.0351) (0.0355) (0.0368)
Mobile ban * 2nd Quintile   0.0935** 0.1074*** 0.1095*** 0.1032*** 
(0.036) (0.0358) (0.0367) (0.0378)
Mobile ban * 3rd Quintile 0.0551 0.0615 0.0638 0.0564
(0.038) (0.0382) (0.0393) (0.0394)
Mobile ban * 4th Quintile 0.0213 0.0223 0.0246 0.0178
(0.039) (0.0387) (0.04) (0.0406)
Mobile ban * 5th Quintile -0.0072 -0.0014 0.0016 -0.0027
(0.044) (0.0449) (0.0463) (0.0463)
Test scores: Age 14 categorical     
Student characteristics    
Other policy changes   
Peer characteristics  
School effects     
Year effects     
Observations 83,211 83,211 83,211 83,211
Notes: Table A.2 presents regression estimates for student performance. The outcome variable is the standardized 
test score. We use robust clustered standard errors at the school level with school and year fixed effects. Student 
characteristics are controlled for whether a student is male, a minority, SEN or FSM. SEN means Special Educational 
Needs students and FSM means Free School Meal students. In this table, students are grouped into five categories 
based on their achievement level at age 14, where group 1 is the lowest-achieving group and group 5 is the highest-
achieving group. The “Other policy changes” variable controls for whether there was a leadership or policy changes 
occurring at the time of the introduction of a mobile phone ban. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Sources: National 
Pupil Database (NPD) and author-conducted mobile phone survey. 
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Table A.3: Effect of Mobile Bans on Student Performance 
Notes: Table A.3 presents regression estimates for student performance. The outcome variable is the standardized test score 
at age 16. We use robust clustered standard errors at the school level with school and year fixed effects. Student characteristics 
are controlled for based on whether the student is male, a minority, SEN and FSM. SEN means Special Educational Needs 
students and FSM means Free School Meal students. The “Other policy changes” variable controls for whether there was a 
leadership or policy changes occurring at the time of the introduction of a mobile phone ban. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: National Pupil Database (NPD) and author-conducted mobile phone survey. 
Age 16 Alternate Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mobile ban 0.0532 0.0588* 0.0618* 0.0627* 0.0600*
(0.0335) (0.0328) (0.0333) (0.0338) (0.0341) 
Prior test scores: Age 11     
Student characteristics    
Other policy changes   
Peer characteristics 
School effects      
Year effects      
Observations 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 
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Table A.4: Effect of Mobile Bans on Student Performance by Student Characteristics 
Notes: Table A.4 presents regression estimates for student performance. The outcome variable is the alternate test scores at age 16 which accounts 
for different difficulty for attaining certain grades. We use robust clustered standard errors at the school level with school and year fixed effects. 
Student characteristics are controlled for whether a student is male, a minority, SEN or FSM. SEN means Special Educational Needs students 
and FSM means Free School Meal students. The “Other policy changes” variable controls for whether there was a leadership or policy changes 
occurring at the time of the introduction of a mobile phone ban. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Sources: National Pupil Database (NPD) and 
author-conducted mobile phone survey. 
Age 16 Alternate Test Scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mobile ban 0.0405 0.0464 0.0442 0.0582* 0.0407
(0.0351) (0.0358) (0.0366) (0.0341) (0.0367) 
Mobile ban * FSM    0.0614** 0.038
(0.0254) (0.0233)
Mobile ban * SEN    0.0815*** 0.0343
(0.0303) (0.0297)
Mobile ban * Male     0.0342
(0.036)
Mobile ban * Prior test scores: Age 11   -0.0531*** -0.0448***
 (0.0129) (0.0124)
Prior test scores: Age 11      
Student characteristics      
Other policy changes      
Peer characteristics      
School effects      
Year effects      
Observations 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 
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Table A.5: Effect of Mobile Bans on Student Performance by Prior Achievement Quintile: Age 11 
Age 16 Alternative Test 
Scores 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Impact by age 11 test scores 
Mobile ban * 1st quintile  0.1080*** 0.1189*** 0.1203*** 0.1183***
(0.036) (0.0371) (0.0374) (0.0375)
Mobile ban * 2nd quintile  0.0910** 0.1018*** 0.1032*** 0.1013***
(0.0353) (0.0358) (0.0364) (0.0366)
Mobile ban * 3rd quintile 0.0593 0.0680* 0.0691* 0.0669*
(0.0365) (0.0370) (0.0376) (0.0381)
Mobile ban * 4th quintile 0.0267 0.0237 0.0247 0.0217
(0.0370) (0.0368) (0.0372) (0.0377)
Mobile ban * 5th quintile -0.0111 -0.0212 -0.0207 -0.0243
(0.0381) (0.0393) (0.0397) (0.0399)
Test scores: Age 11 
categorical 
    
Student characteristics    
Other policy changes   
Peer characteristics  
School effects     
Year effects     
Observations 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482
Notes: Table A.5 presents regression estimates for student performance. The outcome variable is the alternate test scores 
at age 16 which accounts for different difficulty for attaining certain grades. We use robust clustered standard errors at the 
school level with school and year fixed effects. Student characteristics are controlled for whether a student is male, a 
minority, SEN or FSM. SEN means Special Educational Needs students and FSM means Free School Meal students. In 
this table, students are grouped in five categories based on their achievement level at age 11, where group 1 is the lowest-
achieving group and group 5 is the highest-achieving group. The “Other policy changes” variable controls for whether there 
was a leadership or policy changes occurring at the time of the introduction of a mobile phone ban. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Sources: National Pupil database (NPD) and author-conducted mobile phone survey.
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Table A.6: Effect of Mobile Bans on Student Performance – Top 8 subjects 
Age 16 Test Scores – Top 
8 subjects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mobile ban 0.0396* 0.0434* 0.0469* 0.0474* 0.0455* 
(0.0231)  (0.0233) (0.0238) (0.0242) (0.0243) 
Prior test scores: Age 
11 
    
Student characteristics     
Other policy changes    
Prior peer achievement   
School effects        
Year effects        
Observations 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 
Notes: Table A.6 presents regression estimates for student performance. The outcome variable is the standardized 
test score at age 16 on top 8 subjects. We use robust clustered standard errors at the school level with school and 
year fixed effects. Student characteristics are controlled for whether a student is male, a minority, SEN or FSM. 
SEN means special educational needs students and FSM means Free School Meal students. The “Other policy 
changes” variable controls for whether there was a leadership or policy changes occurring at the time of the 
introduction of a mobile phone ban.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: National Pupil Database (NPD) and 
author-conducted mobile phone survey. 
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Table A.7: Effect of Mobile Bans on Probability of Achieving 5 GCSEs Including English and 
Math 
Notes: Table A.7 presents regression estimates for student performance. The outcome variable is the passing GCSE - EM. 
We use robust clustered standard errors at the school level with school and year fixed effects. Student characteristics are 
controlled for whether a student is male, a minority, SEN or FSM. SEN means Special Educational Needs students and 
FSM means Free School Meal students. The “Other policy changes” variable controls for whether there was a leadership 
or policy changes occurring at the time of the introduction of a mobile phone ban.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Sources: 
National Pupil database (NPD) and author-conducted mobile phone survey. 
Age 16 Alternate Test 
Scores 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mobile ban 0.0190* 0.0214** 0.0221** 0.0208** 0.0201** 
(0.0098) (0.0096) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094) 
Prior test scores: Age 11     
Student characteristics    
Other policy changes   
Peer characteristics 
School effects       
Year effects       
Observations 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 130,482 
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Table A.8: Effect of Mobile Bans on School Performance 
School Performance:  % of Students 
Achieving 5 Cs, including English & math 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mobile ban 0.0188* 0.0208** 0.0204** 0.0207** 
(0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0096) (0.0098) 
Prior test scores: Age 11   
Mean student characteristics  
Other policy changes 
School effects    
Year effects    
Schools 90 90 90 90
Observations 816 816 816 816
Notes: Table A.8 presents regression estimates for proportion of student who pass five GCSEs including 
English and Maths examinations. We use robust clustered standard error at the school evel. Student 
characteristics are controlled for whether a student is male, a minority, SEN or FSM. SEN means Special 
Educational Needs students and FSM means Free School Meal students. The “Other policy changes” variable 
controls for whether there was a leadership or policy changes occurring at the time of the introduction of a 
mobile phone ban. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Sources: National Pupil database (NPD) and author-
conducted mobile phone survey. 
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